Version 1 · what the proof shows and where the original paper overreached

What Version 1 proves, and what it does not

The core mechanism works: ethical work can be made more profitable than unethical work through scarcity-linked rewards. Some claims in the original paper were too broad. This page states exactly what the proof shows and where the original paper overreached.

The core mechanism is retained. Ethical work is rewarded with scarce, valuable tokens. Unethical work is excluded from that upside. The penalty is the opportunity cost of missing the scarce upside, not a tax or fine. No balance is debited, no tokens are burned, and no confiscation occurs.
Retained Version 1 result

EETF-gated scarcity-upside exclusion

Let M be the scarcity multiplier, R the funded direct-reward coefficient, L the scarcity-upside coefficient available only to the EETF-eligible branch, and G the complete bounded deviation gain available to the excluded branch. If exclusion is enforceable and G < M(R+L), every exact maximizer over the declared alternatives selects eligibility. For integers with R+L > 0, the least strict multiplier is floor(G/(R+L))+1.

The historical placement U_eligible=M R and U_excluded=G-M L has the same ordering. Adding M L to both alternatives gives the normalized no-debit form above. Upside shared by both branches cancels, so enforceable exclusion is essential.

Version 1.1 remains a separate generalization under M(t)K(t) > B(t). It adds compliance cost, optimizer error, and time-varying relative-growth cases; it does not replace a V1 deployment whose concrete premises fit.

Provenance

The uncorrected 16-page paper is preserved

The exact original academic paper from Git commit a28695f is published as a historical artifact. Its SHA-256 is f5dca5a1e7bcd069441f16410664cdecac3eeebe4a5af8f128dd0efa7043c8bc. The original wording supplies provenance; this page states the current checked claim and corrections.